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Issues and Findings 
Discussed in this Brief: The na-
tional evaluation of the Youth 
Firearms Violence Initiative (YFVI), 
a program initiated by the Office of 
Community Oriented Policing Ser-
vices (COPS) to combat the rise of 
juvenile firearms violence. COPS 
provided up to $1 million to 1 0 
participating cities to fund interven-
tions that employed community 
policing approaches to decrease the 
number of violent firearms crimes 
committed by youths, including 
gang- and drug·related offenses. 
Key issues: From 1985 to 1994, 
the rate of violent criminal acts 
committed by juveniles rose sharply 
at a time when violence committed 
by adults was declining. During that 
time period, while the adult homi-
cide rate fell by 25 percent, the ho-
micide rate for 18- to 24-year-olds 
doubled, and the rate for 1 5- to 17-
year-olds more than tripled. More 
specifically, juvenile homicides com-
mitted with a handgun more than 
doubled, while juvenile homicides 
committed with other weapons 
remained essentially unchanged. 
Key findings: Among the 
evaluation's findings were the 
following: 
• A dedicated unit may exert a 
greater effect on gun-related crime 
than a unit that applies traditional 
tactics and uses patrol officers on a 
·:ating basis. 
When employed as part of YFVI, 
ditional enforcement tactics did 
t produce significant changes in 
!arms violence levels. 
NON-CIRCULATING continued ... 
November 2000 
National Evaluation of the Youth 
Firearms Violence Initiative 
By Terence Dunworth 
Between 1985 and 1994, violent criminal 
acts committed by juveniles grew at an 
alarming pace in the United States. This 
trend diverged significantly from adult 
patterns. From 1985 to 1994, for in-
stance, the homicide rate for adults age 
25 and older declined 25 percent. During 
the same period, the homicide rate for 
18- to 24-year-olds doubled, and the rate 
of homicides committed by teenagers 
ages 15 to 17 tripled. (See exhibit l.) 
Handguns became the weapon of choice 
for juveniles. Exhibit 2 shows that during 
this time period, the number of homicides 
committed by juveniles with handguns 
Exhibit 1. Comparison of juvenile and adult homicide rates, 1976-1997 
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• Cooperation with other law en-
forcement agencies and community 
organizations and representatives 
was a key factor in effective imple-
mentation of firearms violence 
control and prevention strategies. 
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" c • Proactive arrest policies, focused 
on gun-related offenses, were 
shown to have a consistent mea-
surable association with subse-
quent gun-related crime. 
Q) 
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• Most of the participating depart-
ments returned to traditional polic-
ing approaches when Federal 
funding ended. In this sense, YFVI 
did not change the way depart-
ments conducted their business, 
and YFVI strategies were not, in 
general, institutionalized. 
• Most departments found it diffi-
cult to implement the geographic 
information systems called for by 
the initiative. However, all five in-
tensive sites maintained computer-
ized files on incidents (arrests and 
crimes), permitting geographic 
analysis after incident addresses 
were parsed. 
• Not all departments imple-
mented programs that focused on 
the objectives of the YFVI. This sug-
gests that Federal agencies will 
sometimes need to play a strong 
role in ensuring that grantees ad-
dress and meet the strategic intent 
of the initiatives they fund. The 
challenge is for the Federal agency 
to do this while simultaneously pro-
moting local generation and defini-
tion of programmatic activities. 
0 
Q) 








Source: FBI Supplementary Homicide Reports 
more than doubled, while the number of 
juvenile homicides involving other weap-
ons remained essentially constant. 
TheY outh Firearms Violence Initiative 
(YFVI) was launched in 1995 by the U.S. 
Department of Justice's Office of Commu-
nity Oriented Policing Services (COPS). 
It provided up to $1 million to the police 
departments of 10 participating cities (Bal-
timore, Maryland; Birmingham, Alabama; 
Bridgeport, Connecticut; Cleveland, Ohio; 
Inglewood, California; Milwaukee, Wiscon-
sin; Richmond, Virginia; Salinas, Califor-
nia; San Antonio, Texas; and Seattle, 
Washington) to fund interventions directed 
at combating the rise of youth firearms via-
Target audience: State and local 
law enforcement, probation, and lence. The initiative encouraged these ju-
parole officials; policymakers and risdictions to employ community policing 
planning officials; court administra- approaches to develop or enhance youth-
tors; and researchers. focuse .-1 programs designed to decrease the 
NOT REMOVE:. fR(JMb ofviolentfirearmscrimes,reduce 
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the number of firearms-related gang of-
fenses, and reduce the number of firearms-
related drug offenses. 
YFVI was conceived at a time when juve-
nile violence was ascending and seemed 
little influenced by any previously at-
tempted interventions. Although some 
strategies seemed promising (the Boston 
Gun Projectl and the St. Louis "Knock 
and Talk" program,2 for example), they 
were not in general use, and the criminal 
justice community expressed little confi-
dence at that time that the solutions to the 
problem had been identified. YFVI was 
an attempt to rectify that deficiency. 
COPS provided general programmatic 
guidelines to the 10 departments but re-
quested action plans that reflected local 
needs. The cities proposed a mix of en-
forcement programs (both street level and 
I • Research in Brief •• 
school based), prevention programs, 
and information systems enhance-
ments. Exhibit 3 shows budget alloca-
tions by category for each site, as set 
forth in the final plans. Overall, about 
60 percent of the grant was budgeted 
for law enforcement staff, and most of 
this was devoted to police personnel, 
through either overtime expenses or 
the creation of new positions. A little 
less than one-fourth of YFVI funds 
was budgeted for local evaluation, 
civilian consultants (e.g., for training), 
and community-based organizations 
and activities. Nearly 15 percent-
more than $1 million collectively-
was budgeted to purchase computer 
hardware and software or to develop 
information systems. 
The national evaluation 
The National Institute of Justice (NIJ) 
sponsored the national valuation of 
YFVI (from the fall of 1 95 through 
the summer of 1998) to assess the 
impact of the sites' strategies for ad-
dressing youth firearms violence, to 
describe how the sites implemented 
these strategies, and to inform other 
jurisdictions about the successes and 
failures of these strategies. The evalu-
ation solicitation specified that there 
should be five "intensive" and five 
"nonintensive" sites. In the intensive 
sites, impact and intensive process 
evaluations would be conducted; in the 
nonintensive sites, only summary pro-
cess evaluations would be conducted.3 
The impact evaluations would deter-
mine the impact of YFVI on levels of 
youth firearm violence, while the pro-
cess evaluations would focus on pro-
gram implementation and organization. 
Specific issues that were investigated 
in the process evaluations at alllO 
sites included: 
• Program development: How and 
why the sites selected their strate-
gies, their target selection process, 
implementation problems encoun-
tered during the intervention, and 
changes made to the program dur-
ing the intervention. 
• Officer training: The content and 
focus of YFVI-related training 
implemented at the sites. 
• Team selection: The process for 
selecting supervisors and officers for 
YFVI interventions and any problems 
caused by the selection process. 
• Computer systems support: The 
computer systems used to support 
YFVI operations and the overall 
utility of these systems for such an 
initiative. 
• Strategies and tactics: The types 
of enforcement, community polic-
ing, prevention, and other activities 
undertaken with YFVI grant funds. 
• Program results: What the YFVI-
funded police officers and other 
program elements accomplished, 
such as the number of arrests made 
and the number of guns seized. 
• Local evaluation role: The types 
of evaluation activities undertaken 
and an overall assessment of the 
appropriateness of the evaluation 
approaches. 
Exhibit 3. Budget allocations for the 10 YFVI police departments, by category of expense 
Total YFVI Law Civilian Consultants 
Site Funding Enforcement and Local Evaluation Equipment 
Baltimore $999,906 $821,897 $51,900 $23,104 
Birmingham 744,896 94,000 118,750 465,286 
Bridgeport 916,748 496,170 320,120 74,258 
Cleveland 685,342 562,692 100,000 12,650 
Inglewood 787,201 532,536 56,575 81,000 
Milwaukee 999,990 533,343 125,844 60,000 
Richmond 457,119 277,931 152,936 10,100 
Salinas 999,524 623,108 73.200 246,000 
San Antonio 999,963 695,195 170,000 99,740 
Seattle 999,990 416.400 205,500 214,980 
Total $8,590,679 $5,053,272 $1,374,825 $1,287,118 
* Miscellaneous costs include supplies, training materials, travel, and conference attendance . 
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This information was obtained throu~ 
a review of program materials (project-
related documents, such as the site's 
proposal to COPS, quarterly progress 
reports, interim and final reports, and 
other internal documents); periodic tele-
phone and onsite interviews with police 
supervisors and officers participating 
in the YFVI initiative; ridealongs with 
YFVI officers; interviews with local 
evaluators; and an analysis of summary 
data provided by the police department 
(YFVI enforcement schedules and activ-
ity logs, for example). 
COPS, NIJ, and Abt Associates Inc. 
determined which sites would be des-
ignated as intensive and nonintensive, 
based on the following criteria: 
• Evaluability, or the likelihood a 
department's strategies would have 
a measurable impact within the 
evaluation period: The evaluability 
potential was considered lower for 
departments that focused on pre-
vention and education (because 
the window of observation was too 
short) or that had diffused or short-
term target areas (too scattered an 
effect in the former, not enough 
time in the latter). 
• Information systems status: 
Change in the level of gun-related 
crime was a critical component of 
the impact evaluation. Thus, com-
plete computerized records span-
ning several years, with accurate 
ages of offenders and suspects and 
specific offense codes for firearms-
related crimes, increased the like-
lihood of successful intensive 
evaluation. 
• YFVI implementation status: 
It was clear that some sites might 
experience significant delays in 
starting their YFVI program. Given 
the short evaluation time period for 
each site, it was critical that the five 
intensive sites have programs up 
and running as soon as possible. 
• Nature of intervention: Some 
sites implemented primarily police-
based enforcement strategies, while 
other sites emphasized prevention, 
community policing, and other in-
tervention approaches. Since the 
evaluation was to focus on a broad 
range of strategies, the intensive 
sites should include both enforce-
ment and prevention tactics, de-
spite the greater difficulty of 
evaluating the latter. 
Based on these criteria, Baltimore, 
Cleveland, Inglewood, Salinas, and 
San Antonio were selected as the in-
tensive sites. Birmingham, Bridgeport, 
Milwaukee, Richmond, and Seattle 
became the nonintensive sites. This 
Research in Brief examines the expe-
rience of the intensive sites.4 
Strategies and tactics 
The strategies and tactics proposed 
by the YFVI departments focused on 
three areas: streets, schools, and com-
munities. Each department employed 
geographic information systems and 
crime analysis to support all three 
areas. Exhibit 4 summarizes the main 
program elements set up by each of 
the five intensive sites. 
COPS encouraged the police depart-
ments to: 
• Work in conjunction with other city 
agencies to promote education, pre-
vention, and intervention programs 
related to handguns and handgun 
safety. 
• Develop community-based programs 
focused on youth handgun violence. 
••• 4 • •• 
• Develop programs involving and as-
sisting families in addressing youth 
handgun problems. 
Furthermore, COPS encouraged juris-
dictions to employ community policing 
strategies to: 
• Implement programs specifically 
designed to decrease the number of 
violent firearms crimes committed 
by youths. 
• Develop or enhance programs aimed 
at reducing firearms-related gang 
and drug offenses. 
• Address the root causes of youth 
firearms violence in specific geo-
graphic areas. 
Traditional enforcement opera-
tions. As noted earlier, most sites used 
street-based operations that featured 
traditional enforcement tactics that the 
departments perceived to be in compli-
ance with the programmatic preferences 
that COPS had communicated at the 
outset of the initiative. Four of the five 
intensive evaluation sites-Baltimore, 
Inglewood, Salinas, and San Antonio--
either set up new enforcement units 
or expanded existing teams. All used 
traditional surveillance and intelligence-
gathering techniques to identify targets 
and to focus the teams' efforts. Actual 
operations, for the most part, involved 
location-specific, street-level activities. 
With the exception of Salinas, which 
adopted a citywide approach, YFVI 
teams targeted specific neighborhoods 
within their cities. During the life of the 
initiative, the teams adjusted their tar-
gets based on their perceived effects on 
the problem or the likelihood that fire-
arms would be present at a particular 
location at a particular point in time. To 
make such judgments, the teams used a 
combination of intelligence and analy-
ses of their own past performance. 
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Exhibit 4. Police department strategies and tactics 
Total Budget and Street-Based School-Based Community-Based GIS*/Crime 
Site Configuration Activities Activities Activities Analysis 
Baltimore $999,906 o Juvenile Violent o In Park Heights, 2 city o Community resource cen- o Department had 
o Cherry Hill: 
Crime Flex Team: sur- police officers worked ters (Kobans) in schools GIS capability prior 
ve i\lance, intelligence with middle and high provided a police presence to YFVI 
9 officers gathering, and tar- schools and liaison with commu-
o Park Heights: geted enforcement o Supported the Magnet nity groups 
15 officers o Curfew Enforcement School for Law Enforce- o Curfew enforcement 
Team: focused on ment, a criminal justice o fficers provtcled informa-
chronically truant curriculum for high tion, counseling, and llous-
students school students tng to truant students and 
o Three officers imple- families 
mented the Straight 
Talk About Risk (STAR) 
Program 
Cleveland $685,342 o Residential Area Polic- None o RAPP House officers o Department had 
o - 27 officers, ing Program (RAPP) coordinated cleanup GIS capability prior 
2 sergeants Houses in neighbor- and youth activities to YFVI 
hoods with high vio-
o RAPP House used for neigh-
lence, staffed around borhood meetings 
the clock for 90 days 
Inglewood $787,201 o SAGE program: civil None o Rites-of-Passage Mentor- o Juvenile records 
o Strategy Against remedies against ing Program used police computerized for 
Gang Environments gang members; task officers, firefighters, and YFVI 
(SAGE) Gang force focused on community leaders to teach o Internally developed 
Enforcement Task weapons violations youths civic values, self- a GIS system (with 
Force : 1 sergeant, o STEP: act with crimi- esteem, and conflict minimal YFVI fund-
6 officers nal sanctions against mediation in g) 
o Strengthened the street gangs and o Gun and Weapons 
St reet Terrorist a task force that Buy-Back Program 
Enforcement and conducted street o KIDSAFE campaign taught 
Prevention (STEP) enforcement parents about the dangers 
Task Force: 6 officers, o Probation officer tar- of handgun use and 
1 probation officer, geted gang members possession 
1 district attorney on probation 
o Media and poster cam-
paign addressed youth fire-
arm violence prevention 
Salinas $999,524 o VSU: dedicated to None None o An outside contrac-
o Violence Suppres-
work full time on tor implemented 
suppressing youth ArcView/Arclnfo 
sian Unit (VSU): handgun violence system 
1 lieutenant, 
2 sergeants, o Crime tip hotline 
16 officers o Intensified efforts to 
locate firearms and 
track down their 
ongins 
San Antonio $999,963 o Weapons Recovery None None o Research into the 
o Rotation : 9 officers and Tracking Team youth firearm via-
deployed nightly o Street Crime Arrest lence problem 
Team o Computer linkup 
with trauma centers 
throughout the city 
* Geographic information systems. 
5 • • I 
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Perhaps the greatest variation among 
departments was in the way the special 
teams were organized and staffed. At 
one extreme was the fully dedicated 
unit where participating officers were 
relieved of all regular patrol duties 
except in emergencies (as in Salinas); 
the other was the rotating assignment 
of officers to the team on a temporary 
overtime basis (as in San Antonio).5 
In Salinas, roughly 10 percent of the 
sworn complement of 160 officers was 
assigned to a Violence Suppression 
Unit (VSU). They were led by a lieu-
tenant, and two sergeants each man-
aged a team of eight officers. The two 
teams worked a 4-day week, with an 
overlap day used for intelligence 
sharing, cross-team debriefing,-and 
planning. The VSU was housed in a 
location separate from (though close 
to) the main police station, and it oper-
ated independently. Team members 
were relieved of all normal patrol func-
tions, including response to calls for 
service, and were given offsite training 
in other cities. Team leaders planned 
activities in conjunction with team 
members and developed relatively 
long-range plans to address the youth 
firearms problem. The team estab-
lished, monitored, and maintained an 
intelligence system relating specifi-
cally to youths. 
This approach led to a high level of 
acceptance by the team members 
and produced a highly focused effort. 
Members rotated out of the unit only 
for cause, became very knowledgeable 
about the problems they addressed, 
and came to know and be known by 
youths in the city. This created a 
degree of continuity that was highly 
valued by team members. 
The dedicated approach establishes an 
elite unit within a department, risking 
a negative reaction from nonmembers. 
This problem was greatly minimized 
in Salinas because regular patrol 
officers were offered overtime to back-
fill the patrol functions team members 
no longer performed. Furthermore, 
VSU leadership took pains to keep the 
department informed about team ac-
tivities, and cooperative activities in-
volving the team and patrol units were 
promoted whenever possible. 
The San Antonio Weapons Recovery 
and Tracking Team (WRAT) functioned 
at the opposite pole. Union rules man-
dated the equitable rotation of ovet1ime 
across officers, producing a situation in 
which a different set of officers might 
work on WRAT from day to day. This 
model can be considered positive for 
officer equity and opportunity, but it 
limited the continuity of the team's ac-
tivities. Five officers had limited and 
sporadic exposure to the initiative's 
undertakings, and planning and organi-
zation proceeded without much input 
from them. YFVI activities in San 
Antonio, therefore, tended to be more 
reactive than in Salinas. This made 
WRAT more like traditional enforce-
ment and less like community- or 
problem-oriented policing. 
Beyond traditional enforcement. 
Some departments supplemented tra-
ditional enforcement approaches with 
other techniques, some of which were 
enforcement oriented but which dif-
fered from the street-level approach 
discussed above. Others were commu-
nity or school based and embodied a 
more preventive strategy. 
The Inglewood Police Depa11ment 
partnered with the probation depart-
ment, which detailed a full-time officer 
to work from police offices to scmtinize 
gang members on probation. This pat1-
nership was extremely successful, and a 
~ ·. 6 •• l£l 
significant number of violations were 
detected. Inglewood also established the 
Strategy Against Gang Environments 
(SAGE) program, which filed contempt-
of-court sanctions against gang members 
who violated civil injunctions against 
assembly with other gang members. 
This program involved close cooperation 
between the police department and the 
district attorney's office, with the latter 
drafting and obtaining the civil injunc-
tion from the courts. It was difficult and 
time consuming to set up, it garnered 
little community support, and the even-
tual effects were uncertain. Inglewood 
police officers also worked with commu-
nity leaders to set up the Rites-of-
Passage Mentoring Program to teach 
youths civic values, self-esteem, and 
conflict mediation. 
In Cleveland, the initiative funded a 
Residential Area Policing Program 
(RAPP). In a small number of troubled, 
violent neighborhoods, residences once 
used as crack houses or for other illicit 
purposes were convet1ed into police 
substations. Community residents met 
there to coordinate such activities as 
neighborhood cleanups and to commu-
nicate community problems to the po-
lice, and local youths would drop in 
to talk with officers. The houses were 
staffed around the clock by Cleveland 
officers for a period of 90 days. RAPP 
Houses supported by YFVI funds were 
set up consecutively in three different 
neighborhoods. Community residents 
responded favorably, and feedback was 
positive. When the police department 
proposed shutting down the RAPP 
Houses, communities pressed success-
fully for their continued operation. 
Baltimore also initiated school-based 
activities, deploying a small number 
of officers in schools on a more or less 
dedicated basis. The officers empha-
sized educating students about risk, 
••• Researc h in Brie f 
supported a specific criminal justice 
curriculum, and served as counselors 
and advisers as needed. Baltimore 
extended these activities to the com-
munity by establishing community 
resource centers and providing infor-
mation and support to students and 
families relating to curfew violations 
and truancy. 
Outputs and impacts 
The YFVI assessment had a number of 
dimensions, including examining the 
effectiveness of the organization and 
structure of the interventions-that is, 
a qualitative review of the processes 
and procedures that were employed. 
Other dimensions involved measuring 
results generated by the interventions 
and their impact on the problem of 
youth violence. To evaluate results, 
data on the number of arrests made 
and guns seized by YFVI teams were 
considered output measures. To evalu-
ate the possible impact on the prob-
lem, crime trends were analyzed in the 
four intensive sites that emphasized 
enforcement interventions; in Salinas, 
a model of the relationship between 
arrest activity and subsequent gun 
crime levels was developed. 
Output: Arrests made and guns 
seized. Exhibit 5 presents the re-
ported number of arrests made and 
guns seized in four intensive sites. 
No numbers are reported for Cleveland 
because the RAPP Houses did not 
make arrests and seizures a goal, 
and the RAPP neighborhoods were 
too small to yield useful statistical 
information. 
The numbers vary from site to site de-
spite relatively similar levels of Fed-
eral funding. However, although such 
counts need to be reported, caution 
must be exercised before these output 
Exhibit 5. Enforcement outputs: Arrests made and guns seized by YFVI units 
City Arrests• Guns Seized 
Baltimore 723 88 
Clevelandb N/A N/A 
Inglewood' 350 42 
Salinas 713 180 
San Antoniod 2,142 254 
a. Includes all adult and juvenile arrests, not limited to gun-related arrests. 
b. No data on enforcement outputs were provided because the focus of Cleveland's YFVI effort was on 
stabilizing the RAPP House areas, rather than on seizing guns and making arrests. 
c. Includes only arrests and seizures made within the primary YFVI target area (Darby-Dixon). 
d. Data include arrests and gun seizures in 1996 by the entire San Antonio Gang Crime/Intelligence Unit, 
not just the eight YFVI-funded officers in that unit. Figures were taken from the local evaluation report. 
measures are used to draw conclusions 
about program effectiveness in any of 
the sites. There are several reasons for 
such caution. 
First, the correspondence of arrests 
and seizures to YFVI activities varies 
by site. Some sites implemented effec-
tive tracking systems to capture YFVI 
enforcement information, but others 
did not. Salinas data, for example, ac-
curately represent the VSU activities 
because the counts were sufficiently 
detailed that individual officers' activi-
ties could be identified from comput-
erized department records. In other 
sites, however, the information pre-
sented in exhibit 5 was not so easy to 
interpret. The Inglewood numbers, for 
instance, are probably an undercount 
because they reflect activity only in 
the primary target area (Darby-Dixon) 
and do not capture YFVI team opera-
tions outside that area. San Antonio 
numbers were probably an overstate-
ment because they reported arrests 
and seizures made by officers outside, 
as well as inside, the YFVI unit. 
Second, the scope of the data available 
for review did not permit an assess-
ment of the relative quality of the 
Ill •• 7 
arrests made. This information would 
be helpful. For example, an arrest of 
a youthful repeat felon may have a 
significantly greater effect on public 
safety than a first-time arrest of an 
adult offender for a minor infraction. 
Third, large numbers of arrests and 
seizures cannot necessarily be consid-
ered a sign of success, and few arrests 
and seizures do not necessarily indi-
cate failure. Geographically focused 
enforcement efforts viewed as success-
ful typically start out with high arrest 
figures; then, the number of arrests de-
creases significantly. An intervention 
that emphasizes deterrence through 
frequent contact and involvement with 
potential youthful offenders may pro-
duce fewer arrests than a traditional 
enforcement approach. It might be 
characterized by a greater number of 
field interviews, for instance. Yet it 
might be more effective in suppressing 
violence than enforcement efforts that 
emphasized arrests and seizures. 
Fourth, some sites, such as San Anto-
nio, used tactics specifically designed 
and implemented to make arrests and 
seize guns, while other sites deliber-
ately implemented tactics designed 
••• Research in Brief • •• 
for other purposes. In Cleveland, for 
example, the RAPP House officers 
focused on community interaction and 
stabilizing the neighborhood instead 
of on arrests and seizures. 
Finally, a citywide enforcement 
strategy-such as the approach imple-
mented in San Antonio--was more 
likely to yield larger numbers of ar-
rests and seizures than a strategy that 
focused on a small geographic area, 
where the extended presence of YFVI 
officers would undoubtedly reduce the 
likelihood that persons would carry 
guns on their person. Whether YFVI 
officers responded to citizen calls for 
service or if they were freed from that 
responsibility and could focus exclu-
sively on their proactive enforcement 
efforts was another related factor. 
Two sites-Salinas and San Antonio--
experimented with different tactics to 
determine which yielded the greatest 
numbers of arrests and seizures. San An-
tonio, for example, employed five major 
tactics: search warrants, saturation 
patrol, directed patrol, knock and talk, 
and bar checks. Salinas used eight major 
tactics: profile enforcement, suppression 
enforcement, probation searches, sur-
veillance enforcement, search warrants, 
arrest warrants, informant development, 
and gang certification. A productivity 
measure for each tactic was produced 
based on the amount of time devoted to 
the tactics and the number of guns 
seized using each tactic. Executing 
search wanants was by far the most pro-
ductive tactic in both sites. In Salinas, 
this tactic was 4.5 times more likely to 
result in a gun seizure than any other 
tactic. In San Antonio, the cost (in terms 
of officer hours) per firearm seized via 
search warrants was about 10 times less 
than the cost per seizure of any other 
tactic. Additional details on these figures 
are available in the Salinas and San 
Antonio case studies (see "Supplemen-
tary YFVI Reports"). 
Impact: Gun crime trends. To as-
sess gun crime trends, incident-level 
police data were obtained from the five 
intensive sites from January 1993 until 
the middle of 1997. These data pro-
vided access to facts about crimes and 
arrests, including the time and place 
of occurrence, the crime associated 
with the incident, and the suspects 
(if any). This information made it pos-
sible to map the incidents (identifying 
which ones took place in target areas), 
to derive or estimate the age of the 
perpetrators (designating incidents in-
volving juveniles), and to establish a 
baseline for at least 2 years prior to the 
commencement of YFVI (facilitating 
comparisons over time). Standardized 
procedures for classifying the data 
were developed and applied to all 
sites. (See "Crime Classification.") 
In each of the five cities, reported gun 
crimes declined after YFVI was imple-
mented. Reductions also took place 
in all but one of the target areas (see 
exhibit 6). Citywide decreases were 
greatest in San Antonio (41 percent), 
followed by Inglewood (23 percent), 
Cleveland (15 percent), Salinas (11 
percent), and Baltimore (2 percent). 
Target-area reductions were greatest 
in Darby-Dixon in Inglewood (49 per-
cent), Cleveland RAPP House areas 
(38 percent), and San Antonio (37 
percent). In Baltimore, the Cherry Hill 
target area experienced no change, 
while Park Heights declined by 8 per-
cent. In Salinas, where the initiative 
was conducted citywide, the target-
area concept is irrelevant. 
When these broad comparisons are 
made, the target-area decreases in gun 
crime were considerably greater than 
citywide decreases in three of the target 
areas (Cleveland RAPP Houses, Darby-
Dixon in Inglewood, and Park Heights 
in Baltimore). Though San Antonio's 
target areas showed a significant 
Exhibit 6. Gun-related offenses in five sites 
12-Month Period 12-Month Period 
Before YFVI Began After YFVI Began 
Percent Percent 
Number of Involving Number of Involving Percent 
Gun Crimes Youths Gun Crimes Youths Change 
Baltimore 8,764 59 8,581 57 -2 
Cherry Hill 104 79 105 79 0 
Park Heights 643 54 594 52 -8 
Cleveland 3,149 66 2,672 47 -15 
Three RAPP 
Houses 26 69 16 63 -38 
Inglewood 945 40 730 43 -23 
Darby-Dixon 43 70 22 64 -49 
Salinas 
Citywide 552 78 490 79 -11 
San Antonio 2,895 57 1.716 55 -41 
Four target 
areas 523 66 328 52 -37 
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decline (37 percent), the amount was 
less than that which occuned in the 
city at large, and Cherry Hill in Balti-
more showed no change at all.6 
These compmisons are consistent with 
the view that the interventions had an 
effect in some of the sites, even though 
they do not demonstrate causality. Com-
pruing the percentages of gun crimes 
involving youths before and after YFVI 
provides further reason to be cautious. 
Though encouraging declines in the per-
centage of youth involvement in violent 
acts occuned in three of the five loca-
tions-from 70 percent to 64 percent in 
Darby-Dixon in Inglewood, from 66 per-
cent to 52 percent in the four San Anto-
nio target areas, and from 69 percent to 
63 percent around the Cleveland RAPP 
Houses-these reductions are statisti-
cally significant only in San Antonio 
(due to the small number of recorded of-
fenses in the other locations). The reduc-
tion in Baltimore's Park Heights section 
(from 54 percent to 52 percent) was sig-
nificant, but small, and was no greater 
than the citywide reduction. And finally, 
both Chen")' Hill (Baltimore) and Salinas 
experienced virtually no decline at all in 
this measure. 
Charting the trends in general gun 
crime across the 5 years for which 
there are data conveys additional 
information. Exhibit 7 displays the 
trends for four of the sites.7 
Prior to YFVI implementation, gun 
crime patterns in the target areas were 
similar to those in the sunounding city 
or county. Levels of gun crime rose in 
the city of Salinas and in Monterey 
County until late summer 1996, after 
which time they declined. Gun crime 
increased in San Antonio city and 
the target areas until the beginning 
of 1996 and then fell sharply. Gun 
crime in the other two sites gradually 
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Exhibit 7. Gun offense trends in four cities, 1993-1997: Target areas compared with surrounding communities 
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Note: The y-axis represents the weekly number of gun offenses across the 5-year period. These data were plotted by week and then smoothed to obtain the 
trend lines in the displays. A logarithmic scale is used on they-axis for display convenience. This permits they-axis scale to be compressed so that target-area 
and surrounding area trends can be visually represented in the same chart. Doing this does not alter the shape of the trend lines. Data obtained on gun crimes 
in Baltimore do not include nonviolent gun offenses (e.g., carrying a concealed weapon), 
decreased in both the target areas and 
the cities at large. 
The similarity between the large area 
and small area patterns suggests that 
strong societal forces exerted a general 
influence on gun crime trends and that 
these worked similarly in most places. 
Such forces were difficult to identify 
conceptually, let alone measure and 
monitor definitively. Consequently, 
although it was easy to make this 
imputation, it was much more difficult 
to document it.8 
Though the observed trends do not 
demonstrate a causal connection be-
tween the initiative and the declines, 
they offer some supporting evidence 
for the notion that the initiative helped 
produce the desired effects. If, for in-
stance, target areas showed no greater 
decline than surrounding areas or in-
creased at a time when the general 
i!il .. 10 • • ~ 
environment declined, then this would 
constitute supporting evidence for the 
interpretation that the initiative had 
little or no effect. The most dramatic 
change occurred in Inglewood, where 
gun crimes in the Darby-Dixon target 
area dipped sharply during the YFVI 
period and then rebounded to 1994 
levels after YFVI ended. Salinas also 
experienced a proportionally greater 
reduction than surrounding Monterey 
County; again, this took place during 
•• Research in Brief ••• 
the YFVI period. In both cities, this 
evidence supports the notion of a 
YFVI impact on gun crime. 
In San Antonio and Baltimore, target-
area changes were either reductions 
similar in scope to the city at large or 
increases at a time when the city was 
declining. In these two cities, the gun 
crime trends did not support the idea 
that YFVI had an effect on gun crime. 
These interpretations rest on a number 
of assumptions about the YFVI inter-
vention: (1) that the underlying target-
area trends would have continued to 
be like the surrounding area trends 
during and after the YFVI timeframe; 
(2) that simple counts of gun crimes 
are a reasonable measure of the impact 
of interventions of this kind; and (3) 
that the primary effects of the inter-
vention occurred during the measure-
ment period, rather than later. It is 
easy to see how these assumptions 
might be invalid. For example, the 
trends almost certainly do not capture 
possible qualitative YFVI effects, such 
as a reduced potential for younger 
children to become involved in gun 
crimes after the evaluation period 
ended. Also, it is important to remem-
ber that the number of gun crimes 
committed per week in all of these 
cities was quite small; consequently, 
a small change from week to week 
produced a large effect on the chart. 
Effects of arrests on gun crimes in 
Salinas. To explore the effect of gun-
related arrests on the ensuing level of 
gun-related crimes, the research team 
analyzed 210 weeks of Salinas gun 
crimes and gun-related arrests. Using 
data from January 1993 through De-
cember 1996, researchers estimated 
the effect of intensified police activity 
directed toward gun-related crimes 
committed by youths. The number of 
gun-related arrests (in part attributable 
to YFVI) was considered a surrogate 
for the level of police activity. The 
variables used were weekly counts of 
gun-related arrests and gun-related 
crimes, as well as a violent crime 
index for surrounding Monterey 
County, excluding Salinas (countywide 
gun crime data were unavailable, so 
violent crime was substituted).9 
The results indicated that gun-related 
crimes in Salinas were positively re-
lated to Monterey County's crime in-
dex (p = .028) and negatively related 
to previous gun-related arrests in 
Salinas (p = .051). Specifically, a 
10-percentage-point increase in 
Monterey County's crime index was 
associated with one additional gun 
crime in Salinas, and an increase of 
five arrests in Salinas was followed by 
one fewer gun crime in that town. 
The pace at which the effect of past ar-
rests unfolded is depicted in exhibit 8. 
The graph indicates that 40 percent of 
the effects of increased arrest activity 
occurred within 1 week after an arrest, 
64 percent (the sum of 40 percent and 
24 percent) occurred within 2 weeks, 
and so on. Because more than 95 per-
cent of the eventual effect occurred 
within 6 weeks, then, for practical pur-
poses, this can be considered the time 
interval within which the eventual to-
tal effect of arrests on gun crime will 
be made. 
This model suggests with a high de-
gree of statistical confidence that, in 
Salinas at least, enforcement directed 
proactively at firearms possession and 
use has a measurable effect on subse-
quent firearms crime. This implies that 
such activities likely had a quick and 
salutary impact on crime. Further-
more, this relationship persisted over 
a fairly long period of time (4 years in 
this city). Nevertheless, the potential 
magnitude of the impact is obviously 
finite and is bound to diminish at some 
point. That is, the marginal impact of 
additional units of effort (say, one 8-
hour shift for one officer) will decline 
as more shifts are added. In addition, 
other cities may not have the same 
experience as Salinas. In fact, during 
Exhibit 8. Effects of gun-related arrests on gun-related crime in Salinas 
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Crime Classification 
rocedures were developed to 
identify certain classes of crimes, such as 
youth gun crimes. This required precise 
definitions of a number of terms, as 
follows: 
Violent crime. The standard FBI defini-
tion of violent crime--crimes involving 
homicide, rape, robbery, or aggravated 
assault-was used in the evaluation. 
Gun crime. For this evaluation, a gun 
crime was defined as any crime in which 
at least one of the associated charges 
explicitly involved firearms. Charges that 
explicitly involved firearms typically fell 
into one of five categories: crimes against 
persons (a robbery or aggravated assault 
with a firearm, for example), discharging 
a firearm, exhibiting a firearm, possession 
of a firearm, and other firearm crimes 
(crimes involving illegal sale or alteration 
of a firearm, for example). Some gun 
crimes involved a single gun-related 
charge, while others involved multiple 
gun-related charges (robbery with a fire-
arm and illegal possession of a firearm by 
a convicted felon, for example). 
Gun arrest. As with the definition used 
for gun crimes, a gun arrest was defined 
as one in which one of the arrest charges 
explicitly involved firearms. 
Youth gun crime. A youth gun crime 
was defined as any crime in which at 
the YFVI timeframe, most did not. 
This may he due to the somewhat 
unique nature of the Salinas situa-
tion-a relatively small, geographi-
cally distinct city surrounded by 
agricultural land, in which 10 percent 
of the police department's entire sworn 
complement was dedicated to YFVI 
to the exclusion of all other policing 
responsibilities (except emergencies). 
least one of the associated charges ex-
plicitly involved firearms and at least one 
person involved in the crime was a youth. 
Thus, the "age" classification of a par-
ticular crime was assumed to be the age 
of the youngest arrestee or suspect in-
volved in the crime. In the earlier interim 
YFVI reports and in the case study reports 
for the intensive sites, analyses were pre-
sented that used different definitions of 
"youth," including persons aged 14 years 
and under, 15 to 17 years, and 18 to 24 
years. In this Research in Brief, "youths" 
are defined as persons 24 years and un-
der, because this definition corresponds 
most closely to that used by the 1 0 police 
departments. 
Youth gun arrest. Similarly, a youth 
gun arrest was any arrest in which at 
least one of the arrest charges explicitly 
involved firearms and the arrestee was a 
youth. Again, a variety of definitions of 
youth were used in earlier reports; in this 
Brief, a "youth" is defined as a person 
24 years old and younger. 
YFVI target area crimes and arrests. 
Mapping software, in conjunction with 
the street addresses contained in the 
crime and arrest files, was used to deter-
mine which crimes and arrests occurred 
in the YFVI target areas, as well as in ar-
eas immediately adjacent to the target 
areas. 
To match this, a city such as San An-
tonio, for example, would have needed 
to devote about 150 officers to YFVI 
on a full-time basis. Such a level of 
activity would have been impossible 
to support through YFVI because 
each city received roughly the same 
amount of Federal support, regardless 
of its size. 
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Despite these caveats, the Salinas expe-
rience provides strong empirical affir-
mation of what many chiefs and officers 
believe intuitively: A quick "knock 
down" effect can be achieved by inten-
sified enforcement. The diminishing 
marginal utility of intensified enforce-
ment should be investigated fmther. 
Given the inevitable constraints on 
police department revenues, it would be 
useful, for instance, to calculate the 
optimal periodicity and targeting of in-
tensified enforcement-that is, where, 
when, and how often it should be under-
taken. Also, it is worth investigating 
whether there is displacement to other 
geographic areas or a resurgence to 
earlier levels in the same area. 
Residual effects of 
the initiative 
Programs such as YFVI raise a critical 
question: What happens when the 
Federal funding ends? Of particular 
interest are the possible effects YFVI 
programs have on the police depart-
ments themselves. That is, what is the 
prognosis for the YFVI program to 
have a long-term institutional impact 
on the police hosting the intervention? 
Modification in orientation. Police 
officers and supervisors in most YFVI 
sites commented on their department's 
use of overtime to deal with crime more 
effectively. Relieving YFVI officers 
of normal calls-for-service response 
requirements-getting them "off the 
radio"-was an important objective in 
some cities. The general idea of many 
of these programs was to pay overtime 
to the YFVI officers (or the replace-
ments who backfilled their positions) 
while they were in the YFVI program. 
The police agency benefited because it 
increased police presence in the tar-
geted areas, and this presence was not 
created at the expense of 911 or other 
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call-taking systems. In this instance, 
overtime provided organizational flex-
ibility, which was devoted to youth and 
firearms problems. 
Many police officials said unions and 
other officers were much more accept-
ing of the program when overtime 
money was made available to a wider 
number of police officers through the 
backfill process. To some extent, the 
potentially negative effects of the YFVI 
officers' "elite" status were overcome 
by paying other officers to work in the 
positions vacated by the YFVI team. 
The logic offered here is straightfor-
ward: Federal funding can be a force 
multiplier. More officer hours can be 
spent on the street without increasing 
the number of officers in the depart-
ment. However, there is an important 
complication. Implicitly, the Federal 
Government and the departments them-
selves say such efforts as YFVI would 
not be feasible--even if desirable and 
valuable-if additional resources were 
not provided through Federal support. 
Departmental capacity is locally per-
ceived as fully engaged in the opera-
tions being conducted prior to the 
provision of Federal funds. 
This presumption seems to inhibit the 
likelihood of program institutionaliza-
tion and may undermine several problem-
oriented and community-oriented 
policing premises. For example, such a 
presumption suggests that community 
policing and problem solving are luxu-
ries, affordable only after the basic 
functions of policing are accomplished. 
This implies that a combination of 
budgetary constraints and political 
pressures to deal with calls for service 
impedes a department's ability to 
modify its major response systems. 
Rather, a department would continue 
using city budgets to finance regular 
patrols and employ supplementary State 
and Federal dollars for special pro-
grams. Absent the latter, such initiatives 
as YFVI might, therefore, be impossible 
to launch. Such an interpretation seems 
to provide additional support, both nor-
mative and economic, for continuing 
traditional patrol responses. 
This arrangement also implies that the 
cost of providing problem-solving ser-
vices becomes roughly 1.5 times that 
normally incurred by the police (be-
cause the services are paid through 
overtime). In this sense, the cost of po-
lice services in a jurisdiction receiving 
Federal funding will go up, in both a 
relative and an absolute sense, even 
though the increases are "shared" 
by the Federal taxpayer. If the YFVI 
program is established to increase 
problem-solving applications by police 
departments, the model of creating 
overtime to do so may be counterpro-
ductive to the program's long-range 
goals. 
Consequently, the effects of such pro-
grams as YFVI may be restricted to a 
short-term subsidy of traditional police 
patrol responses, unless a department 
either adjusts its strategic and tactical 
responses (learns from the initiative) or 
identifies other funding sources to fill 
the gap when Federal funding ends. 
This view has negative implications 
for continuing and institutionalizing a 
program-a goal of YFVI and of most 
Federal support programs (the Byrne 
Formula Grant Program and the Local 
Law Enforcement Block Grant Pro-
gram, for example). Without sustained 
resources from a source outside the 
regular city budget, it seems unlikely 
that such institutionalization will occur 
in many places, at least not on the 
scale of the funded program. 
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Noteworthy approaches. For the 
most part, the police tactics employed in 
YFVI were largely adapted from the 
patrol model. These included heavily 
patrolling selected areas of the city, 
making traffic stops, and conducting 
field interrogations. In this sense, 
despite the reservations mentioned 
above, most sites implemented a signifi-
cant enforcement effort aimed at youth 
firearms violence. In addition, at least 
three sites (Cleveland, Inglewood, and 
Salinas) undertook strategic innovation 
as a direct consequence of YFVI. 
The Cleveland RAPP Houses created 
a new approach to dealing with dis-
tressed communities, an approach that 
involved more than just a neighbor-
hood substation. The RAPP Houses 
differ from substations because a 
deliberate outreach effort was under-
taken to draw area youths into direct 
contact with police officers in a re-
laxed setting. It is extremely difficult 
to evaluate the effect of this kind of 
program because the behavioral 
change it might induce is specific to 
individuals and long term. Followup 
with particular individuals might be 
necessary to assess how the RAPP 
House approach affected them. How-
ever, this was beyond the scope of the 
evaluation and the timeframe of the 
initiative. The researchers ascertained 
that community reaction was so posi-
tive that residents lobbied for continu-
ing the first RAPP House when it was 
scheduled to close. In addition, par-
ticipating officers were very supportive 
and uniformly appeared to favor the 
strategy. It was also possible to affirm 
that the program would continue at 
some level when the initiative ended, 
suggesting the approach had been 
institutionalized within the command 
structure of the police department and 
city government. 
• Research in Brief • •• 
The Inglewood initiative was notable 
for its combination of enforcement, 
collaboration with other criminal 
justice agencies (probation and the 
district attorney), and creation of com-
munity programs (Rites-of-Passage). 
The police-probation collaboration 
was particularly effective. Police and 
probation officials alike credited the 
funding of a deputy probation officer 
and housing that officer in the police 
department as contributing signifi-
cantly to YFVI's effectiveness. 
Whether this arrangement could be 
continued was not clear at the time 
the evaluation ended, but doing so 
would be highly productive. 
The Salinas intervention was unique 
because it created a dedicated team of 
officers working full time on YFVI, with 
no responsibilities for normal patrol or 
routine call response. (Emergency re-
sponses were still undertaken.) It was 
also unique for the magnitude of the 
effmt relative to the total size of the 
force. Salinas has roughly 160 sworn 
positions. The VSU had 1 lieutenant, 
2 full-time sergeants, and 16 full-time 
officers-more than 10 percent of the 
depa1tment's entire force. Finally, its 
focus was strategically appropriate for a 
YFVI response: It targeted youths in a 
continuous and deliberate manner. 
Summary 
The evidence from Inglewood and 
Salinas supports the view that the 
YFVI intervention coincided with a 
significant drop in the level of gun 
crime in both places. In Inglewood, 
not only did gun crimes drop dramati-
cally during the YFVI implementa-
tion period, but after the initiative 
concluded, gun crimes returned to 
their preinitiative levels. Reductions 
also took place in Salinas and contin-
ued through the end of the observa-
tion period. One difference between 
the two sites is that although Federal 
funding ended in Salinas at about the 
same time as in Inglewood, the Sali-
nas Police Department continued the 
VSU program at essentially the same 
level. Inglewood, on the other hand, 
terminated its police-probation col-
laboration due to lack of funds. The 
implication is that intervention most 
likely reduced gun crime in both 
places. The comparison of target-area 
experience with citywide trends sup-
ports this interpretation. 
In the other intensive sites, YFVI in-
terventions did not appear to produce 
these results. The reasons for this find-
ing are not completely clear, although 
the importance of Salinas' dedicated 
and focused Violence Suppression 
Unit and Inglewood's highly successful 
partnership between the police depart-
ment and the probation office should 
not be underestimated.10 
In conclusion, the results of the YFVI 
effmt seemed to depend on how de-
partments conceived the initiative and 
the consistency of their focus through-
out its life. Given the problems experi-
enced by some departments with 
conceptualization and implementation, 
variability in outcomes was to be ex-
pected. These observations suggest 
the Federal Government could play a 
stronger role in ensuring that partici-
pating departments adhere to the stra-
tegic goals and objectives in future 
initiatives of this kind. Also, funding 
agencies should adopt a timetable that 
more closely matches the exigencies of 
the world in which most departments 
operate. In particular, it is desirable 
for the Federal agency to ensure that 
local recipients do not view an initia-
tive as simply a transfer of Federal 
funds to another level of government. 
Simultaneously, care must be taken 
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not to impose Federal solutions on 
local problems; that is, the strategies 
and tactics that are employed must be 
locally developed. 
Notes 
l. The Boston Gun Project was a problem-
solving effort to reduce gang activity and in-
terrupt the self-sustaining cycle of fear and 
weapons acquisition and use. The methods 
included (1) a use-reduction strategy that em-
ployed both traditional and new technological 
gun tracing to identify and interrupt gun flow to 
youths and (2) a deterrence strategy that com-
municated to youths the severe criminal conse-
quences they would face if they were caught 
with firearms in their possession. 
2. The St. Louis "Knock and Talk" program in-
volved a collaboration between the police and 
community to target firearms possession by 
youths. Police and probation officers made in-
formal visits to the homes of youths suspected 
of possessing guns. The problem was discussed 
with parents and may have included a request 
to permit a search for guns. Respondents were 
immunized from prosecution based on the in-
formation they gave, though not from prosecu-
tion based on uncovered evidence (if a gun 
used in a crime was found, for example). 
3 . The process evaluations are reported in 
detail in the 10 case studies and the cross-site 
report. See "Supplementary YFVI Reports." 
4. The 10 sites were split into 2 equal groups 
for budgetary reasons. No comparative ranking 
of site interventions or results was implied by 
the actual selection. Case studies for all 10 
sites were produced by the evaluation and can 
be located through the National Criminal Jus-
tice Research Service. See "Supplementary 
YFVI Reports." 
5. Additional details on these figures are 
available in the Salinas and San Antonio case 
studies. See "Supplementary YFVI Reports." 
6. The declines that occurred were all statisti-
cally significant beyond the .05 level with the 
exception of the Cleveland RAPP Houses, 
where the low number of gun crimes leads to 
ap = .14. 
7. Cleveland is excluded because the level of 
gun crime in the RAPP House areas was too 
small for charts to be useful. In the other sites, 
target-area data are compared to citywide data, 
except in the case of Salinas, where the county 
was substituted because the intervention was 
citywide. Also, violent crime in general was 
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